Kimmo Eriksson, Mälardalen University
According to social intuitionist research, moral (or “injunctive”) norms are often not rationally motivated. Where do these norms come from then? We propose that one way in which injunctive norms emerge is through inference from beliefs or information about how people typically behave (i.e., from “descriptive” norms). Specifically, we hypothesize that such inferences occur in accordance with Hume's naturalistic fallacy, such that if a behavior is known to be common it is interpreted as being prescribed and if the behavior is known to be uncommon it is interpreted as being condemned. Joint work with Pontus Strimling and Julie Coultas.
Värdar för seminariet är Peter Hedström, David Sumpter och Fredrik Liljeros från Institutet för Framtidsstudier. Seminariet är gratis och äger rum kl. 12.30–14.00 på Institutet för Framtidsstudier, Holländargatan 13, Stockholm.