Date: 15 February 2013
Kimmo Eriksson, Mälardalen University
According to social intuitionist research, moral (or “injunctive”) norms are often not rationally motivated. Where do these norms come from then? We propose that one way in which injunctive norms emerge is through inference from beliefs or information about how people typically behave (i.e., from “descriptive” norms). Specifically, we hypothesize that such inferences occur in accordance with Hume's naturalistic fallacy, such that if a behavior is known to be common it is interpreted as being prescribed and if the behavior is known to be uncommon it is interpreted as being condemned. Joint work with Pontus Strimling and Julie Coultas.
Seminars hosts are Peter Hedström, David Sumpter and Fredrik Liljeros from the Institute for Futures Studies. The seminars are free of charge and take place at 12.30–14.00 in the Institute’s seminar room at Holländargatan 13, Stockholm.