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What Is ‘Real’ in Probabilism?

Stefánsson, H. Orri | 2016

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Pages 1-15, Received 11 Dec 2015, Published online: 04 Sep 2016

Sammanfattning

This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real; and, second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Pages 1-15, Received 11 Dec 2015, Published online: 04 Sep 2016

Sammanfattning

This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real; and, second, the claim that the fundamental norm of Probabilism is not that numerical degrees of belief should satisfy the probability axioms, but rather that comparative beliefs should satisfy certain constraints.