Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 95, Issue 4, pp. 1-6. doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1269352

Sammanfattning

Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude.

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