Lundgren, Björn | 2017
Philosophia 45(3): 1275–1282. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5.
In this reply I defend Kripke’s creationist thesis for mythical objects (Reference and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Goodman’s counter-argument to the thesis (“Creatures of fiction, objects of myth”, Analysis, 74(1), 35–40, 2014). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke’s theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.
In a recent paper, Jeffrey Goodman presents a simple but seemingly efficient argument against a few philosophers’ theses on the creation of mythical objects (2014). One of these philosophers is Kripke; I will defend his creationist thesis against Goodman’s argument.
I will explain the relevant details of Kripke’s specific creationism as this reply evolves, however – in general – a creationist is someone who believes in the existence of contingently created abstracta, e.g., a fictional creationist believes in the existence of the fictional abstracta such as Sherlock Holmes, while a mythical creationist believes in the existence of mythical abstracta such as unicorns (cf. p. 35).
Läs artikeln: Mistake is to Myth What Pretense is to Fiction: A Reply to Goodman.