utilitas
Bentham's Mugging
Utilitas, 2022, 1–6 Abstract A dialogue, in three parts, on utilitarian vulnerability to exploitation. Read the whole article
Asymmetry and Non-Identity
Utilitas, Volume 31, Issue 3, pp.213-230. doi.org/10.1017/S0953820818000341 Abstract In this article we distinguish two versions of the non-identity problem: one involving positive well-being and one inv
Positive Egalitarianism Reconsidered
Utilitas Abstract According to positive egalitarianism, not only do relations of inequality have negative value, as negative egalitarians claim, but relations of equality also have positive value. The eg
Consequentialism and Robust Goods
Utilitas, 1–9, doi:10.1017/S0953820819000116 Abstract In this article, I critique the moral theory developed in Philip Pettit’s The Robust Demands of the Good: Ethics with Attachment, Virtue, and Respecvirtue and respect. I argue that Robust-Goods Consequentialism fails because it implies very implausible value judgements.
Persson's merely possible persons
in: Utilitas 32 (4): 1-9 (2020) Abstract:All else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the world worse, and creating an ecstatic person makes it better. Such claims are easily justified if it
Persson’s Merely Possible Persons
Bykvist, K., & Campbell, T. (2020). Persson's Merely Possible Persons. Utilitas,32(4), 479-487. doi:10.1017/S0953820820000199 AbstractAll else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the worl
Completed: Harm and discrimination
What is it that makes discrimination wrong? We examine the concept of harm and its philosophical relevance, as well as the role it plays in discrimination.
Human Empowerment and the Utility Ladder of Freedoms
Christian Welzel Center for the Study of Democracy, Leuphana University Seminars hosts are Peter Hedström, David Sumpter and Fredrik Liljeros from the Institute for Futures Studies. The seminars are fr
Epistemic Utility Theory Meets Population Ethics
Epistemic utility theorists have recently started addressing the question of how to compare epistemic states that differ in the number of propositions they have an opinion on. It has become apparent t
Julia Nefsky: Expected Utility, the Pond Analogy and Imperfect Duties
Plats: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, StockholmResearch seminar with Julia Nefsky, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto. Register hereAbstractThis talk brings to