Epistemic utility theorists have recently started addressing the question of how to compare epistemic states that differ in the number of propositions they have an opinion on. It has become apparent that the problems that this question raises for epistemic utility theory are structurally analogous to problems that population ethicists have been discussing the last three decades. In particular, it turns out that epistemic utility theorists have their version of Parfit’s “repugnant conclusion” to worry about. The aim of this workshop is to discuss what epistemic utility theorists can learn from population ethicists (and vice versa).
Gustaf Arrhenius (IF), Alejandro Pérez Carballo (UMass Amherst), Jennifer Carr (UCSD), Hilary Greaves (Oxford), Ben Levinstein (Oxford), Graham Oddie (CU Boulder), Richard Pettigrew (Bristol).
Time: 17–18 November
Place: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, Stockholm.
Please e-mail H. Orri Stefánsson (email@example.com) if you are interested in attending the workshop.
The workshop is supported by grants from Vetenskapsrådet (VR).