greves
Hilary Greaves
I am a Professor of Philosophy, and Director of the Global Priorities Institute, at the University of Oxford. My current research focuses on various issues in moral philosophy. My interests include: fo.
Vox: Hilary Greaves is the world's leading philosopher of the long-term future
Hilary Greaves, professor of philosophy at Oxford and researcher at IFFS, is the world's leading philosopher of the long-term future, according to the American news site Vox. Among the work that Vox m
Hilary Greaves: The collectivist critique of effective altruism
Hilary Greaves: Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, and a Tutorial Fellow at Somerville College, Oxford. The previous topic "Reductionism about personal identity, prudential value and
Climate Change and Optimum Population
The Monist, Volume 102, Issue 1, pages: 42-65. doi.org/10.1093/monist/ony021 Abstract It is often claimed that reducing population size would be advantageous for climate change mitigation, on the ground
Discounting for Public Policy: A Survey
Economics and Philosophy 33(3), pp. 391-439. Published online 31 May 2017. doi.org/10.1017/S0266267117000062 Abstract This article surveys the debate over the social discount rate. The focus is on the ec
Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐being
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Published online 7 November 2016. doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12334 Abstract An important objection to preference‐satisfaction theories of well‐being is that these the
Studies on climate ethics and future generations vol. 3
Working paper series 2021:1-10 Joe Roussos & Paul Bowman (eds) This volume comprises the third collection of working papers by researchers within the program Climate ethics and future generations.Th
Completed: Longtermism
What happens to moral philosophy, decision theory, and our real-life decisions, if we consider that in fact many of the decisions we make should take into account the consequences in a very far future?
Epistemic Utility Theory Meets Population Ethics
Epistemic utility theorists have recently started addressing the question of how to compare epistemic states that differ in the number of propositions they have an opinion on. It has become apparent t
Well-being and population ethics
Workshop on well-being and population ethics. Part of the project ‘Valuing future lives’ (‘Att värdera framtida liv’), funded by the Swedish Research Council (‘Vetenskapsrådet’). Venue: The Institute f
