I am an Associate Professor in the School of Philosophy, ANU. Prior to my appointment at ANU in 2016, I held a continuing position (eventually as Associate Professor) in Philosophy at the London School of Economics (2008-2016). I work on practical reasoning and rational inference, particularly the representation and negotiation of severe uncertainty, and issues concerning the science-policy interface, particularly climate science and policy. I am currently an Associate Editor of Philosophy of Science. At the Institute for Futures Studies I participate in the research project: Climate ethics and future generations.
Key published papers include:
“Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist”, with Seamus Bradley, Philosophy of Science 83(1) (2016) 1–28.
“Climate Models, Calibration and Confirmation”, with Charlotte Werndl, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64(3) (2013) 609–635.
“The Precautionary Principle: A New Approach to Public Decision-Making?”, Law, Probability and Risk, 5(1) (2006) 19–31.