One part of my research has been within applied ethics. Much of this research has been in connection with international interdisciplinary research projects. I have mainly been concerned with how factual statements and value judgements interrelate in various disciplines, including economics, risk analysis, environmental science, animal welfare science, democratic theory and climate science. I have also studied the precautionary principle and the concept of sustainability.
The other part of my research has been within value theory. I have worked on issues in formal axiology (including population ethics and the value of equality), decision theory and metaethics.
Currently, I am working on the issue of co-ordination in decision making concerning climate change.
“Weak Superiority, Imprecise Equality and the Repugnant Conclusion”, Utilitas 32 (2020) 294–315.
“Future generations in democracy: representation or consideration?”, Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought 6-3 (2015) 535-548.
“Climate change and compensation”, Public Reason. 5-2, (2013) 21-32 (With Tine Bech Flanagan).
“Unacceptable Risks and the Continuity Axiom”, Economics and Philosophy 28-1 (2012) 31-42.
“A Philosophical Assessment of Decision Theory”. In Sabine Roeser; Rafaela Hillerbrand; Per Sandin; Martin Peterson (eds.). Handbook of Risk Theory. Springer, 2012, 405-439.
“Millian Superiorities and the Repugnant Conclusion”, Utilitas 20 (3) (2008) 279-300.
“Corporate Responsibility: The Stakeholder Paradox Reconsidered”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 20 (2007) 515-532.
“What is the Difference between (Moderate) Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism?”, Economics and Philosophy 19 (2003) 89-109.
“The Moral Foundation of the Precautionary Principle”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 15 (2002) 39-55.