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Labour Migrants Unbound?
Institutet för Framtidsstudiers skriftserie: Framtidens samhälle nr 2, 2006 The future always seems to come as a surprise. A good example would be the eastern enlargement of the EU two years ago. Regar
Whatever You Want: Inconsistent Results is the Rule, Not the Exception, in the Study of Primate Brain Evolution
PLoS ONE Abstract Primate brains differ in size and architecture. Hypotheses to explain this variation are numerous and many tests have been carried out. However, after body size has been accounted for
The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics - Interview with the editors
If we can affect how many people will be born in the future, what does that mean for our decisions today? Would it be bad if much fewer people would exist in the future, as an adaption to climate chan
Do Offenders Deserve Proportionate Punishments?
Criminal Law & Philosophy Abstract The aim of the paper is to investigate how retributivists should respond to the apparent tension between moral desert and proportionality in punishment. I argue th
Equality of opportunity and the precarization of labour markets
European Journal of Political Theory, DOI: 10.1177/1474885117738116 Abstract How can we equalize opportunities while respecting people’s freedom? According to a view that I call libertarian resourcism, pbecome a powerful weapon to criticize work conditionality as unfair and perfectionistic (or illiberal), and to motivate political struggles for the emancipation of the precariat. However, similar views are also expressed in many other justifications of basic income that stress the strategic importance of exit-based empowerment. This article argues that the reliance of these theories on concepts and assumptions of libertarianism makesthem ill-equipped to justify core requirements of social empowerment, and to identify the forms of agency needed to sustainably advance the radical objectives they favour. The implication of this is not to reject the link between social justice and unconditional resource endowments but to dissociate the justification and design of such measures from libertarian ways of thinking.
Peter Vallentyne: Interest-protecting versus choice-protecting rights
Peter Vallentyne, Florence G. Kline Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri ABSTRACTA person is wronged when her rights are infringed, but when exactly are rights infringed? Th
William MacAskill: Should I donate now, or invest and donate later?
William MacAskill, Associate Professor in Philosophy at Lincoln College, Oxford ABSTRACTSuppose you are a philanthropist, and want to help others by as much as possible with your money. Should you dona
Erik Angner: Nudging as Design
Erik Angner, Professor of Practical Philosophy Abstract The nudge agenda due to Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein has proven polarizing. To advocates, nudging allows us to improve people’s choices and th
What we talk about when we talk about equality
Equality seems like a simple enough notion. It is about everybody having the same amount of whatever resources we care about. But is it really that simple? The American philosopher Larry Temkin tells
Wlodek Rabinowicz: Aggregation of value judgments differs from aggregation of preferences
Wlodek Rabinowicz, Senior Professor of Practical Philosophy at Lund university and Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics ABSTRACTIn this talk I focus on a contrast between aggregation