Christian Welzel Center for the Study of Democracy, Leuphana University Seminars hosts are Peter Hedström, David Sumpter and Fredrik Liljeros from the Institute for Futures Studies. The seminars are fr

Epistemic utility theorists have recently started addressing the question of how to compare epistemic states that differ in the number of propositions they have an opinion on. It has become apparent t

Plats: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, StockholmResearch seminar with Julia Nefsky, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto. Register hereAbstractThis talk brings to

Topoi, doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9519-z Abstract Orthodox expected utility theory imposes too stringent restrictions on what attitudes to risk one can rationally hold. Focusing on a life-and-death gambl

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx035 Abstract According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of th

Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy, red. Martin Peterson. Cambridge University Press Abstract Suppose that you prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. Your preferences violate Expected Utility Theory

Daniel J. Benjamin, Professor (Research) of Economics, Center for Economic and Social Research, University of Southern CaliforniaOri Heffetz, Associate Professor of Economics, Cornell University, Samu

Philosophy of Science, Vol. 82, No. 4, p. 602-625. DOI: 10.1086/682915 Abstract Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true

Economics & Philosophy Abstract Suppose that a decision-maker’s aim, under certainty, is to maximize some continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare. Can such a decision-

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(2), 2017: 485-533. Abstract The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value de