tentative

Ethnic stereotypes over time - a Nordic comparison
How has stereotypes of immigrant and minority groups evolved in Finland and Sweden? Comparative text analysis is used to understand how they have changed since 1945.
Research seminar with Claes Lernestedt: Frankenstein's Heirs
Venue: Institutet för framtidsstudier, Holländargatan 13, 4th floor, Stockholm, or online.Research seminar with Claes Lernestedt, Professor of Law, Stockholm University.Register hereAbstract This resear, has (at least formally) yet to start. The project might be thought of as interdisciplinary, with a base in law (I’m a criminal law professor), Thoughts presented will be very tentative, and I welcome any kind of input.
Discrimination and Future Generations
In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.),Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract In this paper, I analyse whether the present generation’s choices. This has been tentatively suggested in both legal theory and philosophy; I review such suggestions briefly in section 1. However, a more rigorous analysis – outlining the concept, relevant grounds, and wrong-making features of discrimination, and applying these to future generations – is still lacking. To address this lacuna, I propose a theory of discrimination and analyse why it might seem to apply – yet ultimately fails to apply – to the differential treatment of future generations. More specifically, I propose a definition of discrimination (section 2.1) and an account of the moral wrongness of discrimination (section 2.2). I moreover explore the connection between discrimination and theories of social (in)justice (section 2.3). I then apply this theory to the problem of differential treatment of future generations. While discrimination may occur between collectives, such as generations (section 3.1), my analysis shows that the specific temporal status of future generations is not comparable to other grounds of discrimination, such as gender or race (section 3.2). Moreover, due the non-identity problem and the problem of lack of a “community of social meaning” between generations, future generations cannot be claimed to be subjected to worse treatment by the present generation (section 3.3). Hence, their differential treatment due to the present generation’s choices does not amount to discrimination. Section 4 concludes and outlines some upshots of my analysis.
The ethics of age limits
This informal workshop focuses on four papers dealing with a variety of ethical questions associated with the use of age limits, especially in health care. Time: Wednesday, November 23, 14:00 - 18:00Plac The Institute for Futures Studies (IFFS), Holländardgatan 13, Stockholm According to Jeff McMahan, we ought to save an individual, A, from dying as a young adult (e.g., at age 30) rather than save some other individual, B, from dying as a newborn, even if the latter intervention would give B twice as many years of full-quality life as the former intervention would give A. Call this claim . I argue that if we accept , then we must reject at least one of three other claims: