Politics, Philosophy and Economics Abstract There are two classic principles for deciding who should have a right to vote on the laws, the All Affected Principle and the All Subjected Principle. This ar

Philos. Technol.35, 24  Abstract Should artificial intelligences ever be included as co-authors of democratic decisions? According to the conventional view in democratic theory, the answer depends on the

Res Publica. doi:10.1007/s11158-016-9348-8 Abstract According to neo-republicans, democracy is morally justified because it is among the prerequisites for freedom as non-domination. The claim that democ

Basic Income Studies, 11 (1), 61–74. https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2016-0013 Abstract A widespread argument in the basic income debate is that the unconditional entitlement to a secure income floor improve

Working papers 2022:1-11 Editor: Paul Bowman Proximity Principle, Adieu Robert E. Goodin Reconceiving the Democratic Boundary Problem David Miller The Boundary Problem and Platitudes About Democracy: A Conc

What decisions should be made with the democratic method? The core question of this project is: Who should have a right to take part in which decisions?

In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.),Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract In this paper, I analyse whether the present generation’s choices. This has been tentatively suggested in both legal theory and philosophy; I review such suggestions briefly in section 1. However, a more rigorous analysis – outlining the concept, relevant grounds, and wrong-making features of discrimination, and applying these to future generations – is still lacking. To address this lacuna, I propose a theory of discrimination and analyse why it might seem to apply – yet ultimately fails to apply – to the differential treatment of future generations. More specifically, I propose a definition of discrimina­tion (section 2.1) and an account of the moral wrongness of discrimination (section 2.2). I moreover explore the connection between discrimination and theories of social (in)justice (section 2.3). I then apply this theory to the problem of differential treatment of future generations. While discri­mination may occur between collectives, such as generations (section 3.1), my analysis shows that the specific temporal status of future genera­tions is not comparable to other grounds of discrimination, such as gender or race (section 3.2). Moreover, due the non-identity problem and the problem of lack of a “community of social meaning” between generations, future generations cannot be claimed to be subjected to worse treatment by the present generation (section 3.3). Hence, their differential treatment due to the present generation’s choices does not amount to discrimination. Section 4 concludes and outlines some upshots of my analysis.

This is an open event with pre-circulated papers, including a presentation of the first paper but not the second. See abstracts below. Schedule 13.15 Coffee 13.30 “Legitimate Authority and Social OntologAuthor: Laura Valentini, LSECommentator: Aaron Maltais, Stockholm University

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1463615 Abstract This study analyzes the demographics, criminality, and network relations of forty-one deceased Swedish foreign fighter

Thought, doi.org/10.1002/tht3.410 Abstract Hedonism claims that all and only pleasure is intrinsically good. One worry about Hedonism focuses on the “only” part: Are there not things other than pleasure