Hedonism, Desirability and the Incompleteness Objection

Andric, Vuko | 2019

Thought, doi.org/10.1002/tht3.410

Abstract

Hedonism claims that all and only pleasure is intrinsically good. One worry about Hedonism focuses on the “only” part: Are there not things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, that are intrinsically good? If so, it can be objected that Hedonism is incomplete. In this paper, I defend Hedonism against this objection by arguing for a distinction between goodness and desirability that understands “desirability” as a deontic concept, in terms of “reason to desire”, but goodness as an evaluative concept. Based on this distinction, I attempt to show that Hedonists should accept that things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, are desirable for their own sakes but deny that these things are intrinsically good 

Link to the article: Hedonism, Desirability and the Incompleteness Objection

Thought, doi.org/10.1002/tht3.410

Abstract

Hedonism claims that all and only pleasure is intrinsically good. One worry about Hedonism focuses on the “only” part: Are there not things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, that are intrinsically good? If so, it can be objected that Hedonism is incomplete. In this paper, I defend Hedonism against this objection by arguing for a distinction between goodness and desirability that understands “desirability” as a deontic concept, in terms of “reason to desire”, but goodness as an evaluative concept. Based on this distinction, I attempt to show that Hedonists should accept that things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, are desirable for their own sakes but deny that these things are intrinsically good 

Link to the article: Hedonism, Desirability and the Incompleteness Objection