Katie Steele

I am an Associate Professor in the School of Philosophy, ANU. Prior to my appointment at ANU in 2016, I held a continuing position (eventually as Associate Professor) in Philosophy at the London Schoo. At the Institute for Futures Studies I participate in the research project: .

Katie Steele, Associate Professor, Australian National University. Abstract It is a feature of our ordinary moral talk that some acts are supererogatory, or beyond what is required. But ‘beyond’ in what

Place: At the Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, Stockholm, or online.REGISTERAbstractThe principle of neutrality can be seen as a direct response to the totalistapproach to evaluating popu

Katie Steele: Neutrality About Creating Good Lives - No Panacea For Longtermism

The principle of neutrality can be seen as a direct response to the totalist approach to evaluating populations of varying constitution and size: while the latter holds that the addition of a good lif

Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

Cambridge University Press The main aim of this Element is to introduce the topic of limited awareness, and changes in awareness, to those interested in the philosophy of decision-making and uncertain

Working paper series 2021:1-10 Joe Roussos & Paul Bowman (eds) This volume comprises the third collection of working papers by researchers within the program Climate ethics and future generations.Th

Working papers 2023-1-11 Tim Campbell & Olle Torpman (eds.) 1. How to Feel About Climate Change? An Analysis of the Normativity of Climate Emotions Julia Mosquera & Kirsti Jylhä 2. How to Value a

Studies on climate ethics and future generations vol 1

Working reports 2019 nr 1–11. Paul Bowman & Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (eds) There is a very rich scientific literature on different emission pathways and the climatic changes associated with them.

Working paper series 2020:1–11. Paul Bowman & Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (eds) This volume comprises the second round of preprint papers written as part of the Climate ethics and future generations