In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.),Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract Decision-makers are in a hurry to find morally justified response

in: Analysis (2020) Volume 80:3. AbstractA notorious problem that has recently received increased attention in axiology, normative theory and population ethics is the apparent ubiquity of what can be g. This paper illustrates how nondeterminacy can spawn cyclical rankings. So, accepting that practical reasons can admit of nondeterminacy challenges the widely held idea that ‘better than’ is transitive. As a result, standard approaches to rational choice under nondeterminacy fail to be action-guiding, since in some situations all options are dominated, that is, impermissible according to standard rational choice criteria.

in: Saving People from the Harm of Death, Eds. Espen Gamlund and Carl Tollef Solberg, p. 255-266, Oxford University Press. In this volume, leading philosophers, medical doctors, and economists discuss

Topoi, doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9519-z Abstract Orthodox expected utility theory imposes too stringent restrictions on what attitudes to risk one can rationally hold. Focusing on a life-and-death gambl

Journal of Economic Methodology 26(3), 195-207 Abstract Behavioral economics has long defined itself in opposition to neoclassical economics, but recent developments suggest a synthesis may be on the hor

in: Analysis, Volume 80, Issue 3 AbstractDaniel C. Dennett has long maintained that the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is confused. In a joint work with Christopher Taylor, he claims to have

i:  Economics and Philosophy Vol. 36:1 AbstractCritical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population

Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2021), 51: 4, 256–269 Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? According to the stan

The dangers of excessive ambitions within the social sciences - Jon Elster

www.iffs.se Part 1: In this lecture Jon Elster diagnoses this flaw and discusses possible remedies. He argues that actual agents are intrinsically less sophisticated than the models assume them to

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(2), 2017: 485-533. Abstract The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value de