Lukas H. Meyer, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Graz, Austria, and Speaker of the Field of Excellence Climate Change Graz, the Doctoral Programme Climate Change, and the Working Unit MoraIn my talk I argue that fairness concerns are decisive for eventual cumulative emission allocations shown in terms of quantified national shares.I will show that major fairness concerns are quantitatively critical for the allocation of the global carbon budget across countries. The budget is limited by the aim of staying well below 2°C. Minimal fairness requirements include securing basic needs, attributing historical responsibility for past emissions, accounting for benefits from past emissions, and not exceeding countries’ societally feasible emission reduction rate. The argument in favor of taking into account these fairness concerns reflects a critique of both simple equality and staged approaches, the former demanding the equal-per-capita distribution from now on, the latter preserving the inequality of the status-quo levels of emissions for the transformation period. I argue that the overall most plausible approach is a four-fold qualified version of the equal-per-capita view that incorporates the legitimate reasons for grandfathering.

Journal of clinical ethics 28(4): 269-278. Abstract This article provides a new argument and a new value-theoretical ground for person-centered care and shared decision making that ascribes to it the rol

The Black Beach: Moving Images between Swedish and Caribbean Shores

How can we understand life on the former Swedish Caribbean colony Saint-Barthélemy? This project aims to add to our undestanding using artistic methods as a complement to the juridical documents available in archives.

Journal of European Integration Abstract The series of recent crises (EURO, refugees, backsliding, Brexit) challenge the self-portrayal of the European Union (EU) as a community of shared values. Agains

in: Frontiers in political science AbstractPolicy decisions, and public preferences about them, often entail judgements about costs people should be willing to pay for the benefit of future generations

Sanja Bogojević: Infrastructure for the 21st century: how climate change shapes society and law

Sanja Bogojević is Fellow and Associate Professor of Law at Lady Margaret Hall and the Faculty of Law. Prior to joining Oxford Law Faculty, she was Associate Professor (‘Docent’) of Environmental Law

Working Paper 2010 no.6 This paper addresses potential effects of immigration on wage income of predominantly low income Swedish born workers, for which the estimates show mainly a positive relationshi

One commonly observed phenomena on taxation in Africa are regional differences and that southern African countries have higher levels of shares of taxation in GDP. Using a panel data framework and div

European Journal of Political Theory, DOI: 10.1177/1474885117738116 Abstract How can we equalize opportunities while respecting people’s freedom? According to a view that I call libertarian resourcism, pbecome a powerful weapon to criticize work conditionality as unfair and perfectionistic (or illiberal), and to motivate political struggles for the emancipation of the precariat. However, similar views are also expressed in many other justifications of basic income that stress the strategic importance of exit-based empowerment. This article argues that the reliance of these theories on concepts and assumptions of libertarianism makesthem ill-equipped to justify core requirements of social empowerment, and to identify the forms of agency needed to sustainably advance the radical objectives they favour. The implication of this is not to reject the link between social justice and unconditional resource endowments but to dissociate the justification and design of such measures from libertarian ways of thinking.

Philosophical Studies Abstract In her ground-breaking and highly influential book Transformative Experience, L.A. Paul makes two claims: (1) one cannot evaluate and compare certain experiential outcomes  evaluate and compare certain intuitively horrible outcomes (e.g. being eaten alive by sharks) as bad and worse than certain other outcomes even if one cannot grasp what these intuitively horrible outcomes are like. We argue that the conjunction of these two claims leads to an implausible discontinuity in the evaluability of outcomes. One implication of positing such a discontinuity is that evaluative comparisons of outcomes will not be proportionally sensitive to variation in the underlying features of these outcomes. This puts pressure on Paul to abandon either (1) or (2). But (1) is central to her view and (2) is very hard to deny. We call this the Shark Problem.