Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

in Synthese (2020) AbstractWhen an agent learns of an expert’s credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This

Implicit Mind: Belief, Alief and Experience with Kathrin Glüer

Recording from the Implicit Mind Workshop at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, May 2015.

Daniel Cohnitz, Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Utrecht University. Abstract Conspiracy theorists are typically skeptical about the trustworthiness of central governmental institutions. Some philos

PLoS ONE 10(3): e0119309., doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119309 Abstract The field of social network analysis has received increasing attention during the past decades and has been used to tackle a variety o

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, p. 1-11. Abstract This paper discusses a challenge for comparativists about belief, who hold that numerical degree of belief (in particular, subjective probability) i

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Pages 1-15, Received 11 Dec 2015, Published online: 04 Sep 2016 Abstract This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical d

in Analysis, Volume 80, Issue 2 AbstractKurt Gödel’s version of the Ontological Proof derives rather than assumes the crucial (yet controversial) Possibility Claim, that is, the claim that it is possib

Interest Groups & Advocacy volume 10, pp.47–67 AbstractThe weak correlation between lobbying and policy outcomes is puzzling. The main argument developed here is that the puzzle is partly caused by

Journal of Medical Ethics 44: 109-113. doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2017-104250 Abstract Lifetime quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) prioritarianism has recently been defended as a reasonable specification o