Mind, Volume 125, Issue 499, Pp. 691-725. Abstract The Desire-as-Belief thesis (DAB) states that any rational person desires a proposition exactly to the degree that she believes or expects the proposit

Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

in Synthese (2020) AbstractWhen an agent learns of an expert’s credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This

in: Poetics AbstractPsychological dual-process theory has become increasingly popular among sociologists. The dual-process framework accounts for two types of thinking; a fast, associative, automatic o

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx035 Abstract According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of th

Synthese, Volume 193, Issue 6,  pp. 1967–1981DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0823-0 Abstract This paper explores the different ways in which conditionals can be carriers of good and bad news. I suggest a general

Philosophy of Science, Vol. 82, No. 4, p. 602-625. DOI: 10.1086/682915 Abstract Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true

Geoffrey Brennan, Professor at the College of Arts and Social Sciences, Australian National University ABSTRACTThis paper propounds and explicates an 'Iron Law of inter-temporal income dispersion trans

Epistemic utility theorists have recently started addressing the question of how to compare epistemic states that differ in the number of propositions they have an opinion on. It has become apparent t

Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 30(1), 5–22. Abstract It is widely believed that voting rights confer power to individual voters as well as to the collective body of the electorate. This pa