probabilities
Should the probabilities count?
Philosophical Studies, June 2012, Volume 159, Issue 2, pp 205–218. Online first. doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9698-1 Abstract When facing a choice between saving one person and saving many, some people ha
The Difference Principle Would Not Be Chosen behind the Veil of Ignorance.
The Journal of Philosophy 115 (11):588-604, DOI: 10.5840/jphil20181151134 Abstract John Rawls argues that the Difference Principle (also known as the Maximin Equity Criterion) would be chosen by parties
Expert deference as a belief revision schema
in Synthese (2020) AbstractWhen an agent learns of an expert’s credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This
Childhood Poverty and Labour Market Exclusion. Findings from a Swedish Birth Cohort
This paper analyses how living conditions and exposure to poverty during childhood and adolescence affect future probabilities for labour market exclusion and inclusion in early adulthood and in midli
Richard Bradley: Confidence and probability. Climate change assessments and policy decision making
Richard Bradley, professor at the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science ABSTRACTThe periodic assessment reports of the Intergovernment
Belief Revision for Growing Awareness
Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

Mårten Schultz: Risk and responsibility
Legal responsibility comes in different forms. Private law deals with questions of responsibility for harm that someone causes another. The responsibility requires three things: That someone was harme
Incommensurability: Vagueness, Parity and other Non-Conventional Comparative Relations
The workshop will focus on how one can account for value incommensurability, its implications for ethical theory and decision theory.
Incommensurability: Vagueness, Parity and other Non-Conventional Comparative Relations
The workshop will focus on how one can account for value incommensurability, its implications for ethical theory and decision theory.
Family Structure, Child Living Arrangement and Mothers’ Self-rated Health in Sweden—A Cross-Sectional Study
International Journal of Health Services, 47:2, pp. 298-311, doi.org/10.1177/0020731416685493 Abstract Alternate living, i.e. children living 50-50 with their parents following separation is emerging as