The fourth meeting of the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar in Trinity Term will be on Monday, 16 May, in the Lecture Room on the second floor of the Radcliffe Humanities Building, Woodstock Road, Oxfor

Theoria, Volume 82, Issue 2,p. 166–181,May 2016. DOI: 10.1111/theo.12094 Abstract Recently, in his Rolf Schock Prize Lecture, Derek Parfit has suggested a novel way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion

Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

in Synthese (2020) AbstractWhen an agent learns of an expert’s credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This

Information neglect in judgment and decision-making

A Multidisciplinary Look at Knowledge Resistance ’Knowledge Resistance: Causes, Consequences, and Cures' is a multidiciplinary research program, comprised of studies from the fields of Philosophy, Psy

Rivista Internazionale di Filosfia e Psicologia Abstract This paper focuses on cases of epistemically transformative experiences, as Paul calls them, cases where we have radically different experiences t

Journal of clinical ethics 28(4): 269-278. Abstract This article provides a new argument and a new value-theoretical ground for person-centered care and shared decision making that ascribes to it the rol

Richard Bradley, professor at the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science ABSTRACTThe periodic assessment reports of  the Intergovernment

Completed: Algorithms in public decision-making. Social construction in change

How can we ensure the transparency required in a democracy and still make us of new AI technology in the public sector?

Richard Bradley on climate change assessments and policy decision making

This is a recording from a research seminar at the Institute for Futures Studies in February 2016. The full name of the seminar is: Confidence and probability. Climate change assessments and policy ma