Journal of Graph Theory Abstract We consider the problem of extending partial edge colorings of hypercubes. In particular, we obtain an analogue of the positive solution to the famous Evans' conjecture

The objective of this paper is to examine how family unions or, more precisely, the arrival of children has influenced migration during the three last decades. Both family formation and family dissolu

Ethics, Policy & Environment vol 25, no 3, 371–374 Introduction In ´Consumption-Baed Emissions Accounting and Historical Emissions´(Torpman, 2022), I argued that a move from production-based emissio

How come today’s conservatives are more liberal than yesterday’s liberals? Why has the public opinion in large parts of the world shifted so rapidly in favor of gay and lesbian rights, but been virtua

Wlodek Rabinowicz, Senior Professor of Practical Philosophy at Lund university and Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics ABSTRACTIn this talk I focus on a contrast between aggregation

Economics and Philosophy, 33(1), 2017: 125-138. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267116000274 Abstract Most people at some point in their lives face transformative decisions that could result in experi

Risk Analysis, Published online first, doi.org/10.1111/risa.13265 Abstract The precautionary principle (PP) is an influential principle of risk management. It has been widely introduced into environmental

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Abstract I argue that normative formal epistemology (NFE) is best understood as modelling, in the sense that this is the reconstruction of its methodology o

Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

Jeff McMahan is White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University, a distinguished research fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and a fellow of Corpus Christi College. Abst