philosophies

Reasoning like good lawyers or bad philosophers?
22 November, Institute for Futures Studies. A Multidisciplinary Look at Knowledge Resistance ’Knowledge Resistance: Causes, Consequences, and Cures' is a multidiciplinary research program, comprised o
Vox: Hilary Greaves is the world's leading philosopher of the long-term future
Hilary Greaves, professor of philosophy at Oxford and researcher at IFFS, is the world's leading philosopher of the long-term future, according to the American news site Vox. Among the work that Vox m
Conference: Philosophical Perspectives on Social Injustice
Location: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13 in Stockholm If you plan to attend all or parts of the conference, please register by sending an e-mail to [email protected] Thursday Decem
Anandi Hattiangadi: Philosophical aspects of implicit bias
Anandi Hattiangadi, Professor of Philosophy at Stockholm University. ABSTRACT Recent empirical work on implicit cognition has revealed that many of us display biases in behaviour which are unavailable t
Hobbesianische Theorien des Sozialvertrags
Aufklärung und Kritik, 69, 93-104 Abstract Auch Dr. Vuko Andrić befasst sich in "Hobbesianische Theorien des Sozialvertrags" mit dem Verhältnis von Politik und Philosophie. Er weist nach, dass Hobbes’ T

Luke Russell - What is forgiveness? On the philosophical disagreements of what forgiveness is
In this episode we are going to talk about forgiveness. Recently Luke Russel, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Sidney, held a research seminar here at the institute titled What i
Are the Natural Numbers Fundamentally Ordinals?
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3), 564-580 Abstract There are two ways of thinking about the natural numbers: as ordinal numbers or as cardinal numbers. It is, moreover, well‐known that the
Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox
Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

Climate emotions and affective dilemmas. A psychological and philosophical study of their normative principles and the public's perceptions
An interdisciplinary projects that tries to understand the normativization of climate emotions. How "should" we feel about climate change?
Mistake is to Myth What Pretense is to Fiction: A Reply to Goodman.
Philosophia 45(3): 1275–1282. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5. Abstract In this reply I defend Kripke’s creationist thesis for mythical objects (Reference and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Go). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke’s theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.