Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 22, no 2., doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10016-8 Abstract There is a fixed limit on the greenhouse gas emissions that the atmosphere can absorb before triggering dang

The Journal of  Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-019-09316-z Abstract Although popular, control accounts of privacy suffer from various counterexamples. In this article, it is argued that two such

in Philosophy Compass (2020) Abstract:Catastrophic risk raises questions that are not only of practical importance, but also of great philosophical interest, such as how to define 'catastrophe' and wha

European Sociological Review, 2017, Vol. 33, No. 3, 337–348 In research on fatherhood premiums and motherhood penalties in career-related outcomes, employers’ discriminatory behaviours are often argued

Demography, 54(2): 459-484, doi.org/10.1007/s13524-017-0550-x Abstract We examine the relationship between birth-to-birth intervals and a variety of mid- and long-term cognitive and socioeconomic outcom

Strategic Management Journal, 2022, 1-28 Abstract AI-based technologies increasingly substitute and complement humans in managerial tasks such as decision making. We investigate how such change affects

Chiara Cordelli: The Wrong of Capitalism Beyond Domination

Political philosophy is witnessing a revival of critiques of capitalism. Against those who argue that capitalism is unjust because of (i) its distributive outcomes, (ii) the oppression of workers at t

Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

in Tonry, M. (ed.) Of One-eyed and Toothless Miscreants: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Abstract Conflicts between relative and absolute proportionality are an imp

Chapter in Hélène Ruiz Valérie Rosoux Alessandra Donati (red.), Representing the Absent, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag. Find the full book here > Abstract Recognising widely held concerns regarding ‘presentchapter challenges the contention that democratic legitimacy inexorably requires the inclusion of futuregenerations in democratic decisions. According to two requirements of democratic legitimacy – inclusionand constitutional empowerment – people should be empowered to participate in decisions about policyand law, and to determine the rules structuring the political framework. Drawing a distinction betweenthese requirements, this chapter contends that though it may be feasible to ‘include’ future generations forproxy representation, future generations cannot enjoy ‘constitutional power’.