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Krister Bykvist
I am Professor in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University and Institute for Futures Studies. I was a Tutorial Fellow at Jesus College, Oxford, and a CUF Lecturer in
Krister Bykvist: Moral uncertainty
Professor in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University and Institute for Futures Studies. ABSTRACT How important is the wellbeing of non-human animals compared to the we

Krister Bykvist: Who should care about impossibility theorems in population ethics?
Research seminar with Krister Bykvist, Professor in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University and Institute for Futures Studies. This seminar was arranged by the Insti
Research seminar with Krister Bykvist: Who should care about impossibility theorems in population ethics?
Online seminar. Register here > Research seminar with Krister Bykvist, Professor in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University and Institute for Futures Studies. This se, New Jersey, USA.
Malcolm Fairbrother (presenter): How Much Do People Value Future Generations? (paper together with Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell, webinar)
Malcolm Fairbrother is professor of sociology at Umeå University and researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies. In this seminar he presents the paper How Much Do People Value Future Generations? C
Moral Uncertainty
Oxford University Press Very often we're uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We don't know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, how strong our duties are to improve the live
Review of Dennis McKerlie’s Justice Between the Young and The Old
Ethics, Vol. 125, No. 3 (April 2015), pp. 895-900. Reviewed Work: Justice between the Young and the Old by McKerlie, Dennis published by: University of Chicago Press. DOI: 10.1086/679532
Reply to Orsi
Mind, Vol, 124 (496):1201-1205 . DOI:10.1093/mind/fzv070
Moral uncertainty
Philosophy Compass, 12:3 2017. DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12408 Abstract What should we do when we are not certain about what we morally should do? There is a long history of theorizing about decision-making und
Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 95, Issue 4, pp. 1-6. doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1269352 Abstract Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about eth