Olle Risberg

I am a researcher at the Department of Philosophy at Uppsala University, Sweden, and at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm. I am also a member of the Young Academy of Sweden. My research fo

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism Review of Peter Königs,Problems for Moral Debunkers: On the Logic and Limits of Empirically Informed Ethics. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter, 2022. Pp.: 9783110750171.

Journal of the American Philosophical Association Abstract Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the moral facts

in Klenk, M. (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2020. (ISBN: 0367343207) AbstractSome philosophers question whether higher-order evidence can support the radical sk

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism10 (ISSN: 2210-5697). Abstract:A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focuses on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlyi

Graham Oddie

I am a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado (Boulder). Originally from New Zealand, I defended my PhD dissertation, on the concept of truthlikeness, at the London School of Economics

Progress in Ethics

This is an international network of researchers from a variety of disciplines, providing a forum for discussions on what progress have been made in the field of ethics.

PROGRESS IN ETHICS Workshop at the Institute for Future Studies (IFFS), Stockholm, 19-20 June 2023  This is an open workshop, but seats are limited. Interested in attending? Send an e-mail to [email protected]:30 – 11:00: Coffee  11:00 – 12:30: Finnur Dellsén (University of Iceland/Inland Norway University/Oslo), Tina Firing (University of Iceland), and James Norton (University of Iceland), “Understanding Philosophical Progress”  12:30 – 14:00: Lunch  14:00 – 15:30: Joe Roussos (IFFS), “When is agreement between moral models significant?”  15:30 – 16:00: Coffee  16:00 – 17:30: Ylwa Sjölin Wirling (Gothenburg), “A portrait of understanding as a nonfactive state”