Kimmo Eriksson, Mälardalen University According to social intuitionist research, moral (or “injunctive”) norms are often not rationally motivated. Where do these norms come from then? We propose that o

Economics & Philosophy Abstract Suppose that a decision-maker’s aim, under certainty, is to maximize some continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare. Can such a decision-

Stefan Schubert

My research in recent years has focused on effective altruism, and in particular the question of why most people are not more effective when helping others. Lucius Caviola and I have recently compiled (Oxford University Press, Open Access).

Economics and Philosophy, Volume 31, Issue 03, p. 371-395. Abstract This paper develops a Multidimensional Decision Theory and argues that it better captures ordinary intuitions about fair distribution o

Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy Abstract If the extension of a moral expression varies depending on the context of utterance, as contextualism maintains, then two speakers who embrace differen

Theoria, Volume 84, Issue 4. doi.org/10.1111/theo.12166 Abstract In 1997 John Broome presented the Collapsing Argument that was meant to establish that non‐conventional comparative relations (e.g., “par

Workshop on well-being and population ethics. Part of the project ‘Valuing future lives’ (‘Att värdera framtida liv’), funded by the Swedish Research Council (‘Vetenskapsrådet’). Venue: The Institute f

Working paper series 2020:1–11. Paul Bowman & Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (eds) This volume comprises the second round of preprint papers written as part of the Climate ethics and future generations

This workshop is a part of the project Valuing future lives funded by the Swedish Research Council. It will take place at the Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13 in Stockholm. If you are int or .