herlitz
Anders Herlitz
I am a researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies and Professor of Practical Philosophy at Lund University. Previously I was Associate Professor in Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University an
Committing to Priorities: Incompleteness in Macro-Level Health Care Allocation and Its Implications
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43: 724-745. Abstract This article argues that values that apply to health care allocation entail the possibility of “spectrum arguments,” and that it is plausible that
Against lifetime QALY prioritarianism
Journal of Medical Ethics 44: 109-113. doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2017-104250 Abstract Lifetime quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) prioritarianism has recently been defended as a reasonable specification o
Microlevel Prioritizations and Incommensurability
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 27: 75-86. doi.org/10.1017/S096318011700041X Abstract This article addresses the prioritization questions that arise when people attempt to institutionalize reaso
Comparativism and the Grounds for Person-Centered Care and Shared Decision Making
Journal of clinical ethics 28(4): 269-278. Abstract This article provides a new argument and a new value-theoretical ground for person-centered care and shared decision making that ascribes to it the rol
Nondeterminacy, Two-Step Models, and Justified Choice
Ethics, Volume 129, no. 2, pp. 284-308. doi.org/10.1086/700032 Abstract This article analyzes approaches to nondeterminacy (e.g., incommensurability, indeterminacy, parity) that suggest that one can make
Stable and unstable choices
Economics and Philosophy, DOI:10.1017/S0266267119000026 Abstract This paper introduces a condition for rational choice that states that accepting decision methods and normative theories that sometimes en
The indispensability of sufficientarianism
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, published online. doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2018.1479817 Abstract In this paper, I argue that sufficientarian principles are indispensabl
A more plausible collapsing principle
Theoria, Volume 84, Issue 4. doi.org/10.1111/theo.12166 Abstract In 1997 John Broome presented the Collapsing Argument that was meant to establish that non‐conventional comparative relations (e.g., “par
Spectrum arguments, parity and persistency
in: Theoria (2020) Volume 86:4 AbstractThis article shows that introducing the positive comparative relation parity only helps one block so‐called “Spectrum Arguments” in order to avoid their unsavoury
