geoffrey
In memory of Geoffrey Brennan
The staff of the Institute for Futures Studies is deeply saddened to learn that our friend and colleague Geoffrey Brennan has recently passed away. Geoff was a most distinguished scholar and a very val
Geoffrey Brennan: A Brief History of Equality
Geoffrey Brennan, Professor at the College of Arts and Social Sciences, Australian National University ABSTRACTThis paper propounds and explicates an 'Iron Law of inter-temporal income dispersion trans
Geoffrey Brennan: On exchange and its gains
Geoffrey Brennan is an Australian philosopher. He is a professor of philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a professor of political science at Duke University. This seminar was su
Unique research project on climate ethics and future generations
What should we do about climate change? This issue is at the heart of the six-year research project "Climate ethics and future generations" at the Institute for Futures Studies, which will gather worl
Climate ethics and future generations
Workshop within the research project "Climate ethics and future generations", 27–29 September. Audience members admitted by invitation only. 1st Day – 27th September 8:45 – 9:15 Coffee/Breakfast 9.1
Expert deference as a belief revision schema
in Synthese (2020) AbstractWhen an agent learns of an expert’s credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This
Mistake is to Myth What Pretense is to Fiction: A Reply to Goodman.
Philosophia 45(3): 1275–1282. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5. Abstract In this reply I defend Kripke’s creationist thesis for mythical objects (Reference and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Go). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke’s theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.
Fair Chance and Modal Consequentialism
Economics and Philosophy, Volume 31, Issue 03, p. 371-395. Abstract This paper develops a Multidimensional Decision Theory and argues that it better captures ordinary intuitions about fair distribution o
Counterfactual Desirability
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(2), 2017: 485-533. Abstract The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value de