Criminal Law & Philosophy, pp. 1-18, Online först. Abstract In this paper, I defend fairness-based retributivism against two important objections, the no-benefit objection and the social injustice o

Professor Brad Hooker, Philosophy Department, University of Reading. Consider the view that an individual behaves unfairly if, only if, and because (1) The individual treats people who are NOT relevantlAnd(2) The individual fails to treat people who ARE relevantly different in accordance with their relevant difference (e.g., needy/non-needy, someone who has a right against the individual/someone who doesn’t have a right against the individual, etc.).

Larry Temkin, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers School of Arts and Sciences. The State University of New Jersey. ABSTRACT The goal of this talk is modest. It is simply to help illuminate

Equality As Comparative Fairness with Larry Temkin

Recording of a seminar at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, May 2015.

Games and Cultures, doi.org/10.1177/1555412018800650  Abstract Unpredictable social dynamics can dominate social outcomes even in carefully designed societies like online multiplayer games. According to

Venue: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13 in Stockholm, and online Note that the speaker will join us online. Research seminar with Mike Otsuka, Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers Universit

Lukas H. Meyer, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Graz, Austria, and Speaker of the Field of Excellence Climate Change Graz, the Doctoral Programme Climate Change, and the Working Unit MoraIn my talk I argue that fairness concerns are decisive for eventual cumulative emission allocations shown in terms of quantified national shares.I will show that major fairness concerns are quantitatively critical for the allocation of the global carbon budget across countries. The budget is limited by the aim of staying well below 2°C. Minimal fairness requirements include securing basic needs, attributing historical responsibility for past emissions, accounting for benefits from past emissions, and not exceeding countries’ societally feasible emission reduction rate. The argument in favor of taking into account these fairness concerns reflects a critique of both simple equality and staged approaches, the former demanding the equal-per-capita distribution from now on, the latter preserving the inequality of the status-quo levels of emissions for the transformation period. I argue that the overall most plausible approach is a four-fold qualified version of the equal-per-capita view that incorporates the legitimate reasons for grandfathering.

Nature Human Behavior Abstract Liberals and conservatives often take opposing positions on moral issues. But what makes a moral position liberal or conservative? Why does public opinion tend to become m

Equality seems like a simple enough notion. It is about everybody having the same amount of whatever resources we care about. But is it really that simple? The American philosopher Larry Temkin tells

Stéphane Zuber

I am an economist at Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Paris and an associate professor at Paris School of Economics. I work on issues of intergenerational equity and climate poli