in: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory Eds.Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, Oxford University Press. Can it be better or worse for a person to exist than not to exist at all? This old and challenging exis

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 edition), Zalta, E. (red.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/nonidentity-problem The nonidentity problem raises questions regardin

in: Weighing and Reasoning. Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, Eds.Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner, Oxford University Press. The person affecting restriction states that one outcome can only be

Philosophia 45(3): 1275–1282. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5. Abstract In this reply I defend Kripke’s creationist thesis for mythical objects (Reference and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Go). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke’s theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.

Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

in: Utilitas 32 (4): 1-9 (2020) Abstract:All else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the world worse, and creating an ecstatic person makes it better. Such claims are easily justified if it

Magnus Bygren

I am professor in Sociology at Department of Sociology, Stockholm University. My research currently aligns with three overlapping themes: (1) the existence and degrees of discrimination within differen

Erkenntnis, pp. 1-24. Abstract It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such counterfactual skepti

This article addresses the matter of “urban spillover” in rural population development, i.e. how urban localities tend to push a ring of diffuse urban growth outwards as they expand in area. The data

Moral uncertainty

Participants: Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord and William MacAskill. Very often we are uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We do not know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, how