ekonomistas
We're All Behavioral Economists Now
Journal of Economic Methodology 26(3), 195-207 Abstract Behavioral economics has long defined itself in opposition to neoclassical economics, but recent developments suggest a synthesis may be on the hor
Parfit and the economists: A contribution to the debate on the optimal population size
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 102, 23-37 Abstract This paper presents Derek Parfit’s contribution to the debate on the optimal population size, as it has been developed by economists. Parfit’s des
Healthcare Rationing and the Badness of Death: Should Newborns Count for Less?
in: Saving People from the Harm of Death, Eds. Espen Gamlund and Carl Tollef Solberg, p. 255-266, Oxford University Press. In this volume, leading philosophers, medical doctors, and economists discuss
Kriminella på kartan - en ESO-rapport om den organiserade brottslighetens geografi
2023:3. Expertgruppen för Studier i Offentlig ekonomi. Abstract Trots nästan dagliga nyhetsrapporteringar som pekar på motsatsen har det totala våldet per capita i Sverige inte ökat sedan början av 2000
Beyond Uncertainty. Reasoning with Unknown Possibilities
Cambridge University Press The main aim of this Element is to introduce the topic of limited awareness, and changes in awareness, to those interested in the philosophy of decision-making and uncertain
Belief Revision for Growing Awareness
Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.
Moral Uncertainty
Oxford University Press Very often we're uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We don't know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, how strong our duties are to improve the live
Final conference of the Franco-Swedish Program for Philosophy and Economics
The Franco-Swedish Program for Philosophy and Economics will arrange a final conference in Uppsala where a group of prominent philosophers and economists will meet to discuss issues at the border betw
Malcolm Fairbrother: Elites, Democracy and the Rise of Globalization
Dr Malcolm Fairbrother, University of Bristol ABSTRACTWhy have the governments of so many nations decided to globalize their economies in the last 30 years? The literature on this question is polarized
Graham Oddie: What’s so bad about adaptive preferences?
Graham Oddie, Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado Boulder Abstract Our desires and preferences change, but one particular kind of change in preferences has been singled out for opprobrium—so