Economic Letters, vol. 203 Abstract Economic policy evaluations require social welfare functions for variable-size populations. Two important candidates are critical-level generalized utilitarianism (CL

Economics and Philosophy 33(3), pp. 391-439. Published online 31 May 2017. doi.org/10.1017/S0266267117000062 Abstract This article surveys the debate over the social discount rate. The focus is on the ec

With intensified globalization of markets, the restructuring of provisions of welfare services and accumulation of private capital, opportunities for corporate influence in politics have multiplied. IWelcome to a seminar where some of the authors present and discuss the contents of the book.When: Friday December 15th, at 16.00 –18.00 including a mingleWhere: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13 in StockholmSpeakers:Christina Garsten, Professor of Social Anthropology, SCOREAdrienne Sörbom, Associate Professor of Sociology, SCOREAnna Tyllström, PhD in Business Studies, Institute for Futures StudiesStefan Svallfors, Professor in Sociology, Institute for Futures StudiesLiv Fries, PhD Management, Senior Advisor at Decigo The book will not be for sale at the seminar, but a flyer offering discount will be distributed.

in: Frontiers in political science AbstractPolicy decisions, and public preferences about them, often entail judgements about costs people should be willing to pay for the benefit of future generations

Corruption is a serious threat to prosperity, democracy and well-being, with mounting empirical evidence highlighting it detrimental effects on society. Yet defining this threat has resulted in profou

Thomas Sterner, Professor of Environmental Economics, Dept of Economics, University of Gothenburg The Guardian recently decided to change house style and start using terms like Climate Crisis instead o

In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.),Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract In this paper, I analyse whether the present generation’s choices. This has been tentatively suggested in both legal theory and philosophy; I review such suggestions briefly in section 1. However, a more rigorous analysis – outlining the concept, relevant grounds, and wrong-making features of discrimination, and applying these to future generations – is still lacking. To address this lacuna, I propose a theory of discrimination and analyse why it might seem to apply – yet ultimately fails to apply – to the differential treatment of future generations. More specifically, I propose a definition of discrimina­tion (section 2.1) and an account of the moral wrongness of discrimination (section 2.2). I moreover explore the connection between discrimination and theories of social (in)justice (section 2.3). I then apply this theory to the problem of differential treatment of future generations. While discri­mination may occur between collectives, such as generations (section 3.1), my analysis shows that the specific temporal status of future genera­tions is not comparable to other grounds of discrimination, such as gender or race (section 3.2). Moreover, due the non-identity problem and the problem of lack of a “community of social meaning” between generations, future generations cannot be claimed to be subjected to worse treatment by the present generation (section 3.3). Hence, their differential treatment due to the present generation’s choices does not amount to discrimination. Section 4 concludes and outlines some upshots of my analysis.