devising
Defining Information Security
Science and Engineering Ethics 25(2): 419–444. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-017-9992-1. Abstract This article proposes a new definition of information security, the ‘Appropriate Access’ definition. Apar
Defining Social Housing: A Discussion on the Suitable Criteria
Housing, Theory and Society 36(2): 149–166. doi.org/10.1080/14036096.2018.1459826. Abstract The term social housing has been characterized as a “floating signifier”, i.e. a term with no agreed-upon meanin
Deciding the demos: three conceptions of democratic legitimacy
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2017.1390661 Abstract The prevailing view is that democratic procedures are unable to confer democrati
Defining disability and the role of the disability and the medical communities
Theoria Abstract Definitions of disabilityare useful for different purposes and carry normative significance. However, defining disability has proven a difficult task. Communities with different theoreti
Who is Deciding the Future Role of AI in Healthcare in the Nordics?: A Research Brief
Working paper. Malmö University Summary Over the last few years there has been a considerable amount of hype around the potential role of AI in healthcare. This has greatly increased since the COVID-19
The intelligence explosion revisited
Foresight, doi.org/10.1108/FS-04-2018-0042 Abstract PurposeThe claim that super intelligent machines constitute a major existential risk was recently defended in Nick Bostrom’s book Superintelligence and
Belief Revision for Growing Awareness
Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.
PostDoc wanted for research on valuing future lives
The Institute for Futures Studies is looking for a postdoc to be part of a research project on valuing future lives. The applicant needs to hold a PhD degree on a relevant philosophical topic when the (Philosophy).
Completed: Valuing future lives
How should we value future lives when making decisions? This question is directly relevant to for example prioritisation in health care, population control, climate change, and existential risk (the survival of animal species and humanity).
On Tax Efforts and Colonial Heritage in Africa
One commonly observed phenomena on taxation in Africa are regional differences and that southern African countries have higher levels of shares of taxation in GDP. Using a panel data framework and div