I Budolfson, M, McPherson, Tristram & D. Plunkett (eds), Philosophy and Climate Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. From the introduction [...] we believe that philosophical work on climat

Erkenntnis, pp. 1-24. Abstract It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such counterfactual skepti

Philosophia 45(3): 1275–1282. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5. Abstract In this reply I defend Kripke’s creationist thesis for mythical objects (Reference and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Go). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke’s theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.

Laura Valentini, Associate Professor of Political Science at London School of Economics ABSTRACTMany contemporary philosophers—of a broadly deontological disposition—believe that there exist some pre-i. In this paper, I defend this unpopular view. I argue that all rights are grounded in —namely, norms constituted by the collective acceptance of gives “oughts”—, provided the norms’ content meets some independent standards of moral acceptability. This view, I suggest, does justice to the relational nature of rights, by explaining how it is that right-holders acquire the authority to demand certain actions (or omissions) from duty-bearers. Furthermore, the view does not divest human beings of fundamental moral protections. Even if, absent some rights-grounding positive norms, obligations cannot be to others, we still have  (non-directed) placing constraints on how we may permissibly treat one Another.

Larry Temkin, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers School of Arts and Sciences. The State University of New Jersey. ABSTRACT The goal of this talk is modest. It is simply to help illuminate

Criminal Law & Philosophy, pp. 1-18, Online först. Abstract In this paper, I defend fairness-based retributivism against two important objections, the no-benefit objection and the social injustice o

Thought, doi.org/10.1002/tht3.410 Abstract Hedonism claims that all and only pleasure is intrinsically good. One worry about Hedonism focuses on the “only” part: Are there not things other than pleasure

The Journal of  Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-019-09316-z Abstract Although popular, control accounts of privacy suffer from various counterexamples. In this article, it is argued that two such

i:  Economics and Philosophy Vol. 36:1 AbstractCritical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, pp 1-15, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9845-7. Abstract According to the Beneficiary Pays Principle, innocent beneficiaries of an injustice stand in a special mora