Folke Tersman

At the Institute for Futures Studies I serve as Deputy Director, supporting both the Director and the managers in Organizational support. Besides working at the Institute for Futures Studies (IFFS) I a

Ludvig Beckman

I am Professor in Political Science at Stockholm University. In 2000 I defended my dissertation at Uppsala University. I participate in the research project "The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory" t

Pp. 3 - 24 in P. Hedström and P. Bearman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2009. Oxford University Press. Table of Contents Foundations1: Peter Hedström and Peter Bearman: What is analytical sociology all about? An introductory essay by Peter Hedström2: Peter Hedström and Lars Udéhn:

Noûs, (Early View), DOI: 10.1111/nous.12135. Introduction A familiar way of supporting skeptical doubts about the beliefs in some area, such as ethics orreligion, is to provide a “debunking argument” agaiway is to appeal to the disagreement that occurs in the area.2 These types of challenge areoften treated separately and there is not much overlap in the literature they have given rise to.Yet, as they pursue the same conclusion—that the target beliefs are not (fully) justified andthat we should reduce our confidence in them—one might well wonder how they are related.Are they entirely independent or do they interact in non-trivial and interesting ways? That isthe question I shall explore.

Joyce, R., and Kirchin, S. (eds.) (Springer, 2010) in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5, 2015, 333-337. DOI: 10.1163/22105700-05031197

Philosophy Compass 13 (6), 2018.  DOI:10.1111/phc3.12493.  Abstract The idea of reflective equilibrium (IRE) remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of cr

Journal of the American Philosophical Association Abstract Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the moral facts

in Klenk, M. (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2020. (ISBN: 0367343207) AbstractSome philosophers question whether higher-order evidence can support the radical sk

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism10 (ISSN: 2210-5697). Abstract:A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focuses on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlyi