i:  Economics and Philosophy Vol. 36:1 AbstractCritical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population

Vuko Andric

I am a researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies and associate professor at Linköping University. My main research interests lie in ethics and political philosophy. In ethics I am particularly i

Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

Wlodek Rabinowicz

I am senior professor of practical philosophy at Lund University. After defending my doctoral dissertation in Uppsala in 1979, I remained there as associate professor in practical philosophy. 1994-95  and a former editor of and .

in: Analysis (2020) Volume 80:3. AbstractA notorious problem that has recently received increased attention in axiology, normative theory and population ethics is the apparent ubiquity of what can be g. This paper illustrates how nondeterminacy can spawn cyclical rankings. So, accepting that practical reasons can admit of nondeterminacy challenges the widely held idea that ‘better than’ is transitive. As a result, standard approaches to rational choice under nondeterminacy fail to be action-guiding, since in some situations all options are dominated, that is, impermissible according to standard rational choice criteria.

Graham Oddie

I am a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado (Boulder). Originally from New Zealand, I defended my PhD dissertation, on the concept of truthlikeness, at the London School of Economics

Karsten Klint Jensen

One part of my research has been within applied ethics. Much of this research has been in connection with international interdisciplinary research projects. I have mainly been concerned with how factu

Workshop on well-being and population ethics. Part of the project ‘Valuing future lives’ (‘Att värdera framtida liv’), funded by the Swedish Research Council (‘Vetenskapsrådet’). Venue: The Institute f

Online seminar. Register here > Research seminar with Krister Bykvist, Professor in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University and Institute for Futures Studies. This se, New Jersey, USA.

Krister Bykvist: Who should care about impossibility theorems in population ethics?

Research seminar with Krister Bykvist, Professor in Practical Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University and Institute for Futures Studies. This seminar was arranged by the Insti