anell
Liberal nationalism
David Miller, Gina Gustavsson and Yael Tamir, discusses with Philippe van Parijs and moderator Lars Anell. Gustaf Arrhenius and Bengt Westerberg introduce the subject.
Liberal Nationalism - David Miller, Gina Gustavsson, Yael Tamir, Philippe van Parijs
Registration: The seminar is free of charge but you need to register: Click here The seminar will be held in English Several studies show that citizens in North America and Europe have strong emotional ti These questions are the focus of two new books: Liberal Nationalism and Its Critics, and Why Nationalism. We have the great honor to bring together the authors of these books on February 5: David Miller, Gina Gustavsson and Yael Tamir. They will together with political philosopher Philippe van Parijs discuss these topics. The evening is moderated by Lars Anell (Frisinnade klubben, former chairman at Swedish Research Council). Gustaf Arrhenius (Professor of Philosophy and Director at the Institute for Futures Studies) and Bengt Westerberg (Frisinnade klubben, former party leader of the Liberal People's Party) says welcome. : Professor of political theory, Oxford University. The one person most associated with the term “Liberal Nationalism”. Recently published Liberal Nationalism and Its Critics with Gina Gustavsson. : Associate Professor of political science, Uppsala University and Nuffield College, Oxford University. : PhD in political theory, Oxford University. Wrote the much talked about book Liberal Nationalism in 1993. Recently published the book Why Nationalism. Political philosopher from Belgium, one of the world’s most prominent scholars on Universal Basic Income (UBI).
Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox
Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.
