This informal workshop focuses on four papers dealing with a variety of ethical questions associated with the use of age limits, especially in health care. Time: Wednesday, November 23, 14:00 - 18:00Plac The Institute for Futures Studies (IFFS), Holländardgatan 13, Stockholm According to Jeff McMahan, we ought to save an individual, A, from dying as a young adult (e.g., at age 30) rather than save some other individual, B, from dying as a newborn, even if the latter intervention would give B twice as many years of full-quality life as the former intervention would give A.  Call this claim .  I argue that if we accept , then we must reject at least one of three other claims:

in: Analysis, Volume 80, Issue 3 AbstractDaniel C. Dennett has long maintained that the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is confused. In a joint work with Christopher Taylor, he claims to have

in Klenk, M. (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2020. (ISBN: 0367343207) AbstractSome philosophers question whether higher-order evidence can support the radical sk

Bykvist, K., & Campbell, T. (2020). Persson's Merely Possible Persons. Utilitas,32(4), 479-487. doi:10.1017/S0953820820000199 AbstractAll else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the worl

Mikael Holmqvist is Associate Professor of Sociology and Professor of Management at Stockholm University. ABSTRACTAll around the world there are ”leader communities”, i.e., places where leaders choose