weak
Weak support for a U-shaped pattern between societal gender equality and fertility when comparing societies across time
Demographic Research, Volume 40 - Article 2, p. 27–48. Abstract Background:A number of recent theories in demography suggest a U-shaped relationship between gender equality and fertility. Fertility is t
Why Wear Blinders? Boonin and the Narrow Approach to the Non-identity Problem
Law, Ethics and Philosophy vol. 7, 102-126 Abstract Boonin endorses reasoning that leads to what he calls the Implausible Conclusion regarding when future-directed choices that at first glance seem to i
Population axiology and the possibility of a fourth category of absolute value
i: Economics and Philosophy Vol. 36:1 AbstractCritical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population
Biased grades? Changes in grading after a blinding of examinations reform
in: Journal of Assessment and Evaluation in Higher Education 45, 292-303. AbstractGroup differences in average grades prior to and after a step-wise introduction of blinded examinations at Stockholm Un
What calibrating variable-value population ethics suggests
Economics & Philosophy Abstract Variable-Value axiologies avoid Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion while satisfying some weak instances of the Mere Addition principle. We apply calibration methods to two
Completed: Crossing boundaries in social work. Collaborative partnerships and interventions towards particularly vulnerable areas in Sweden
The study explores welfare governance in relation to disadvantaged areas in Sweden. The project aims to contribute with knowledge about how to build trust, promote safety, and break a negative societal development.
Prioritarianism, timeslices, and prudential value
Australasian Journal of Philosophy ABSTRACT This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prud
Continuity and catastrophic risk
Economics & Philosophy Abstract Suppose that a decision-maker’s aim, under certainty, is to maximize some continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare. Can such a decision-
Benefiting from Injustice and the Common-Source Problem
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, pp 1-15, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9845-7. Abstract According to the Beneficiary Pays Principle, innocent beneficiaries of an injustice stand in a special mora
Value Superiority
in: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory Eds. Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, Oxford University Press.DOI:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199959303.013.0013 Suppose that A and B are two kinds of goods such that more
