Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2021), 51: 4, 256–269 Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? According to the stan

i:  Economics and Philosophy Vol. 36:1 AbstractCritical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population

Economic Letters, vol. 203 Abstract Economic policy evaluations require social welfare functions for variable-size populations. Two important candidates are critical-level generalized utilitarianism (CL

Richard Arneson: Should we reward the deserving? Some puzzles

Do plausible fundamental principles of justice incorporate the idea of rewarding the deserving? Utilitarianism is famously indifferent between a world in which saints fare badly and scoundrels fare we

Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 102, 23-37 Abstract This paper presents Derek Parfit’s contribution to the debate on the optimal population size, as it has been developed by economists. Parfit’s des

Stefan Schubert

My research in recent years has focused on effective altruism, and in particular the question of why most people are not more effective when helping others. Lucius Caviola and I have recently compiled (Oxford University Press, Open Access).

in: Weighing and Reasoning. Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, Eds.Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner, Oxford University Press. The person affecting restriction states that one outcome can only be

Economics & Philosophy Abstract Variable-Value axiologies avoid Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion while satisfying some weak instances of the Mere Addition principle. We apply calibration methods to two

in: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory Eds.Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, Oxford University Press. Can it be better or worse for a person to exist than not to exist at all? This old and challenging exis

Sir Partha Dasgupta, Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Cambridge. ABSTRACT In this lecture I study fertility choice in the face of socio-ecological constraints. I assume that when cho