Roger Crisp, Professor of Moral Philosophy, Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St Anne's College, University of Oxford Abstract It is widely believed that one of the main reasons we should seek to d

Kirsty Gover: Aboriginality and Alienage: Legal Pluralism at the Australian Border

Research seminar with Kirsty Gover, Professor at Melbourne Law School. Abstract The landmark Australian High Court case of Love-Thoms (2020) raised the possibility of constitutionalised Indigenous-sett

Place: At the Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, Stockholm, or online. Research seminar with Kirsty Gover, Professor at Melbourne Law School. REGISTER AbstractThe landmark Australian High C

Elizabeth Finneron-Burns

I am a post doc working with Krister Bykvist and Gustaf Arrhenius on the Valuing Future Lives project. I submitted my DPhil thesis at Oxford University in September 2015. Before studying at Oxford I wo

British Journal of Political Science Abstract The climate justice literature typically endorses a moral right to produce subsistence emissions, but this right appears problematic considering how urgent

Hidden convergence in ethics

Ethics has for a long time been dominated by several competing traditions. But is it entirely true that these traditions have not moved closer with time. That is what this project aims to investigate.

This is an open event with pre-circulated papers, including a presentation of the first paper but not the second. See abstracts below. Schedule 13.15 Coffee 13.30 “Legitimate Authority and Social OntologAuthor: Laura Valentini, LSECommentator: Aaron Maltais, Stockholm University

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition) ABSTRACT Appeals to moral disagreement have figured in philosophical discussions since antiquity, especially regarding questions about the nat, 14). It is often dubious to characterize the thoughts of ancient philosophers by using distinctions and terminologies that have emerged much later. Still, it is tempting to take Sextus to offer an argument against the metaethical position known as “moral realism” and its central thesis that there are moral truths which are objective in the sense that they are independent of human practices and thinking.