Folke Tersman

At the Institute for Futures Studies I serve as Deputy Director, supporting both the Director and the managers in Organizational support. Besides working at the Institute for Futures Studies (IFFS) I a

Noûs, (Early View), DOI: 10.1111/nous.12135. Introduction A familiar way of supporting skeptical doubts about the beliefs in some area, such as ethics orreligion, is to provide a “debunking argument” agaiway is to appeal to the disagreement that occurs in the area.2 These types of challenge areoften treated separately and there is not much overlap in the literature they have given rise to.Yet, as they pursue the same conclusion—that the target beliefs are not (fully) justified andthat we should reduce our confidence in them—one might well wonder how they are related.Are they entirely independent or do they interact in non-trivial and interesting ways? That isthe question I shall explore.

Joyce, R., and Kirchin, S. (eds.) (Springer, 2010) in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5, 2015, 333-337. DOI: 10.1163/22105700-05031197

Philosophy Compass 13 (6), 2018.  DOI:10.1111/phc3.12493.  Abstract The idea of reflective equilibrium (IRE) remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of cr

Journal of the American Philosophical Association Abstract Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the moral facts

in Klenk, M. (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2020. (ISBN: 0367343207) AbstractSome philosophers question whether higher-order evidence can support the radical sk

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism10 (ISSN: 2210-5697). Abstract:A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focuses on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlyi

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition) ABSTRACT Appeals to moral disagreement have figured in philosophical discussions since antiquity, especially regarding questions about the nat, 14). It is often dubious to characterize the thoughts of ancient philosophers by using distinctions and terminologies that have emerged much later. Still, it is tempting to take Sextus to offer an argument against the metaethical position known as “moral realism” and its central thesis that there are moral truths which are objective in the sense that they are independent of human practices and thinking.

p.:37-57 in: Ethics and Explanation (eds. W. Leibowitz and N. Sinclair), Oxford: Oxford University Press. More information about the book Ethics and Explanation

In: D. Machuca (ed.), “Moral Skepticism: New Essays”, London: Routledge. Moral skepticism is at present a vibrant topic of philosophical inquiry. This collection of original essays will advance the ong