Ethics, Policy & Environment vol 25, no 3, 371–374 Introduction In ´Consumption-Baed Emissions Accounting and Historical Emissions´(Torpman, 2022), I argued that a move from production-based emissio

in Klenk, M. (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2020. (ISBN: 0367343207) AbstractSome philosophers question whether higher-order evidence can support the radical sk

Charles F. Manski On the 21st and 22nd of January this year Charles F Manski was in Stockholm, invited by the Institute for Futures studies to hold three lectures on his newly published book Public Poli.

Noûs, (Early View), DOI: 10.1111/nous.12135. Introduction A familiar way of supporting skeptical doubts about the beliefs in some area, such as ethics orreligion, is to provide a “debunking argument” agaiway is to appeal to the disagreement that occurs in the area.2 These types of challenge areoften treated separately and there is not much overlap in the literature they have given rise to.Yet, as they pursue the same conclusion—that the target beliefs are not (fully) justified andthat we should reduce our confidence in them—one might well wonder how they are related.Are they entirely independent or do they interact in non-trivial and interesting ways? That isthe question I shall explore.

Synthese, doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01929-5 Abstract A moderately risk averse person may turn down a 50/50 gamble that either results in her winning $200 or losing $100. Such behaviour seems rational i

Journal of the American Philosophical Association Abstract Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the moral facts

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism10 (ISSN: 2210-5697). Abstract:A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focuses on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlyi

Daniel Cohnitz, Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Utrecht University. Abstract Conspiracy theorists are typically skeptical about the trustworthiness of central governmental institutions. Some philos

Criminal Law and Philosophy, Volume 12, Issue 1, pp 125-142. Abstract Retributivism may seem wholly uninterested in the fit between penal policy and public opinion, but on one rendition of the theory, h

Venue: Institutet för framtidsstudier, Holländargatan 13, 4th floor, StockholmResearch seminar with Klemens Kappel, Professor at the Department of Communication, University of Copenhagen.Join us on sit