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Belief Revision for Growing Awareness
Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.
On the ratio challenge for Comparativism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, p. 1-11. Abstract This paper discusses a challenge for comparativists about belief, who hold that numerical degree of belief (in particular, subjective probability) i
Parental union dissolution and the gender revolution
Social Forces Abstract This study investigates two concurrent trends across Europe and North America: the increasing instability of parental unions and men’s rising contributions to household work. Beca
Counterfactual Desirability
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(2), 2017: 485-533. Abstract The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value de
Investigating sequences in ordinal data: A new approach with adapted evolutionary models.
Political Science Research and Methods, Volume 6, Issue 3, pp. 449-466. doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2018.9 Abstract This paper presents a new approach for studying temporal sequences across ordinal variables. I
Is risk aversion irrational? Examining the “fallacy” of large numbers
Synthese, doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01929-5 Abstract A moderately risk averse person may turn down a 50/50 gamble that either results in her winning $200 or losing $100. Such behaviour seems rational i
Episodes of liberalization in autocracies: a new approach to quantitatively studying democratization
Political Science Research and Methods, 1-20 Abstract This paper introduces a new approach to the quantitative study of democratization. Building on the comparative case-study and large-N literature, it
Freedom, Equality, and Justifiability to All: Reinterpreting Liberal Legitimacy
The Journal of Ethics Abstract According to John Rawls’s famous Liberal Principle of Legitimacy, the exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justifiable to all citizens. The currently dominternalistexternalistinclusive
Successful and failed episodes of democratization: conceptualization, identication, and description
Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 97. Abstract What explains successful democratization? This paper makes four contributions towards providing more sophisticated answers to this questishowing that while several established covariates are useful for predicting outcomes, none of them seem to explain the onset of a period of liberalization. Fourth, it illustrates how the identification of episodes makes it possible to study processes quantitatively using sequencing methods to detail the importance of the order of change for liberalization outcomes.
How Large Will the Ukrainian Refugee Flow Be, and Which EU Countries Will They Seek Refuge In?
Delmi Policy Brief 2022:3. Abstract Three weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine more than three million people have fled the war. Knowledge and predictions on the flow of migrants are important for