2010. Nature Physics 6:888-893. AbstractNetworks portray a multitude of interactions through which people meet, ideas are spread, and infectious diseases propagate within a society. Identifying the most

Oxford University Press (2020) Abstract:In the moral responsibility literature, it is often said that blameworthiness presupposes wrongdoing. But there are numerous conceptions of both blame and wrongd is, to our knowledge, the first book-length attempt to spell out what the relevant kinds of wrongdoing and blame are that would make a strong connection between wrongdoing and blameworthiness plausible.

Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

Geoffrey Brennan is an Australian philosopher. He is a professor of philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a professor of political science at Duke University. This seminar was su

In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.),Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract Decision-makers are in a hurry to find morally justified response

Steven Vanderheiden, Associate Professor of Political Science and Environmental Studies, Center for Science and Technology Policy Research (CSTPR), University of Colorado at Boulder Abstract In this tal

Venue: Institutet för framtidsstudier, Holländargatan 13, 4th floor, Stockholm, or online. Research seminar with Katherine Puddifoot, Associate Professor in Philosophy at Durham University. Her recent mnemonic form epistemic injustice

Noûs, (Early View), DOI: 10.1111/nous.12135. Introduction A familiar way of supporting skeptical doubts about the beliefs in some area, such as ethics orreligion, is to provide a “debunking argument” agaiway is to appeal to the disagreement that occurs in the area.2 These types of challenge areoften treated separately and there is not much overlap in the literature they have given rise to.Yet, as they pursue the same conclusion—that the target beliefs are not (fully) justified andthat we should reduce our confidence in them—one might well wonder how they are related.Are they entirely independent or do they interact in non-trivial and interesting ways? That isthe question I shall explore.

Utilitas Abstract According to positive egalitarianism, not only do relations of inequality have negative value, as negative egalitarians claim, but relations of equality also have positive value. The eg

Roger Crisp, Professor of Moral Philosophy, Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St Anne's College, University of Oxford Abstract It is widely believed that one of the main reasons we should seek to d