Ratio Abstract In this paper I analyse how procreative freedom poses a challenge for rule-consequentialism. First, I reconstruct the rule-consequentialist case for procreative freedom. Second, I argue t

Doctoral thesis in practical philosophy, Stockholm: Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University. Abstract In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted ma

Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, published online first. doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2019.1644583 Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between the idea of popula

PLoS ONE Abstract Primate brains differ in size and architecture. Hypotheses to explain this variation are numerous and many tests have been carried out. However, after body size has been accounted for

New Political Economy. Published online. Abstract In this paper, Sweden is used as an example of how organized politics has changed quite dramatically in the last couple of decades. The paper argues that

Stefan Svallfors Working Paper 2016 no. 3(Published in New Political Economy , Vol 21 (6), pp 505-19 (2016). DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2016.1156662) In this paper, Sweden is used as an example of how organize

The role of elite corruption with Janine Wedel

The Role of Elite Corruption in Today’s Illiberalism: Trump as “Trickster,” Why Trumpism is No Accident, and the Corruption Coming Now. This is Janine Wedel's inauguration lecture as a Kerstin Hesselg

Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

Research seminar with Bo Rothstein.AbstractMost definitions of democracy rely on a set of procedural rules for how political power should be accessed legitimately. The basic norm for these procedural ru realized by equal democratic rights. In this understanding of political legitimacy, democracy is a “partisan game” where various interests are given fair possibilities to compete for political power. The concept of “quality of government” relates to the legitimacy in the of political power and is based on the norm of  that is the opposite of partisanship. This is to be realized by, for example, the rule of law and a public administration built on meritocracy. Several tensions between these two bases for achieving political legitimacy will be present. For example, a democratically elected government may want to politicize the public administration and may establish public services and benefits directed only to their political supporters. The rule of law includes the principle of equality before the law, but a democratically elected government may take actions that put itself “above” the law. Various empirical measures and philosophical principles for understanding these type of tensions between democracy and the quality of government will be presented in this lecture.

Bo Rothstein: Is there a contradiction between democracy and quality of government?

Most definitions of democracy rely on a set of procedural rules for how political power should be accessed legitimately. The basic norm for these procedural rules is according to noted democracy theor