Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

in Synthese (2020) AbstractWhen an agent learns of an expert’s credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This

In: G. Sosa-Nunez, & E. Atkins (Eds). E-IR Edited Collections: Environment, climate change and international relations. E-International Relations Publishing. Read more about Edited Collection – Envi

Journal Version Physical Review E 99 Abstract A detailed Monte Carlo study of the satisfiability threshold for random 3-SAT has been undertaken. In combination with a monotonicity assumption we find tha

in: Distinktion: Journal of Social TheoryAbstractThis article evaluates Andreas Wimmer’s theory of ethnic boundary making by applying it to the maintenance of Jewish ethnic identification in Sweden, a

Personality and Individual Differences, Volume: 122, pp. 29-37. doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.10.001 Abstract Ambivalent sexism is a two-dimensional framework that assesses sexist and misogynous attitudes

The Institute for Futures Studies is looking for a postdoc to be part of a research project on valuing future lives. The applicant needs to hold a PhD degree on a relevant philosophical topic when the (Philosophy).

How should we value future lives when making decisions? This question is directly relevant to for example prioritisation in health care, population control, climate change, and existential risk (the survival of animal species and humanity).

Foresight, doi.org/10.1108/FS-04-2018-0042  Abstract PurposeThe claim that super intelligent machines constitute a major existential risk was recently defended in Nick Bostrom’s book Superintelligence and

This paper proposes that education systems can be studied in relation to the welfare state and knowledge society in the global age through discussing the aims of education in relation to core values o