Elizabeth Finneron-Burns

I am a post doc working with Krister Bykvist and Gustaf Arrhenius on the Valuing Future Lives project. I submitted my DPhil thesis at Oxford University in September 2015. Before studying at Oxford I wo

The Journal of Philosophy 115 (11):588-604, DOI: 10.5840/jphil20181151134 Abstract John Rawls argues that the Difference Principle (also known as the Maximin Equity Criterion) would be chosen by parties

I Hanemaayer, A. (editor), Artificial Intelligence and Its Discontents. Palgrave. Abstract (book) On what basis can we challenge Artificial Intelligence (AI) - its infusion, investment, and implementatio

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 69, p. 59-64. Abstract The ultimatum game is a common economic experiment in which some participants reject another's unfair offer of how to split some

European Journal of Political Theory, DOI: 10.1177/1474885117738116 Abstract How can we equalize opportunities while respecting people’s freedom? According to a view that I call libertarian resourcism, pbecome a powerful weapon to criticize work conditionality as unfair and perfectionistic (or illiberal), and to motivate political struggles for the emancipation of the precariat. However, similar views are also expressed in many other justifications of basic income that stress the strategic importance of exit-based empowerment. This article argues that the reliance of these theories on concepts and assumptions of libertarianism makesthem ill-equipped to justify core requirements of social empowerment, and to identify the forms of agency needed to sustainably advance the radical objectives they favour. The implication of this is not to reject the link between social justice and unconditional resource endowments but to dissociate the justification and design of such measures from libertarian ways of thinking.

Journal of Medical Ethics 44: 109-113. doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2017-104250 Abstract Lifetime quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) prioritarianism has recently been defended as a reasonable specification o

Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

in: The Dimensions of Poverty: Measurement, Epistemic Injustice, Activism (ed. V. Beck, H. Hahn & R. Lepenies), New York: Springer. 2020. AbstractMultidimensional poverty measures require implicit,

British Journal of Social Psychology Abstract Throughout the literature, there are assertions that those endorsing conservative ideologies reject the science and solutions of climate change due to perce

Margaret Moore, Professor in the Political Studies department at Queen’s University. Abstract This paper is interested in developing an account of resource justice, by which I mean a theory about the en